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America’s Forgotten Nuclear Waste Dump 
in the Pacific
Michael B. Gerrard
During the Cold War the United States detonated sixty-seven nuclear weapons over 
the atolls of Bikini and Enewetak in the Marshall Islands. In the late 1970s the United 
States addressed the massive amount of residual contamination by abandoning Bikini 
as permanently uninhabitable and pushing much of the waste at Enewetak into the 
open lagoon. Much of the plutonium was dumped into the crater that had been left by 
an atomic bomb explosion, and then covered with a thin shell of cement. The resul-
tant “Runit dome” sits unmarked and unguarded in a small island and one day will 
be submerged by the rising waters of the Pacific Ocean, unless it is first torn apart by 
typhoons. Radiation from the Marshall Islands has already been detected in the South 
China Sea. Using the experience of the Marshall Islands as a case study, this article seeks 
to shed light on the environmental and security challenges of nuclear waste disposal in 
the Pacific and beyond.
The United States government has not had much luck in building new repositories for nuclear waste. It has abandoned plans for one in Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada, partly out of concern that it could not meet the standard of 
safely containing the radiation for one million years.1 A facility near Carlsbad, 
New Mexico, first opened in 1999, shut down after two accidents in February 
2014.
However, little known even to many specialists in the field, the United 
States built a repository in the late 1970s, filled it with plutonium waste, and 
walked away. It has no signs, guards, or fences and it is on an island threatened 
by the rising seas. The site is in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, halfway 
between Hawaii and Australia. 
This article recounts the origins of this repository, known as the Runit 
dome, the unsuccessful efforts of the people of the Marshall Islands to obtain 
adequate compensation for the losses they endured as a result of the nuclear 
testing program in their homeland, and the likely sorry future of the dome 
and of the nation. This saga stands as a parable of how the flow of modern 
history—a world war, a cold war, and a warming planet—have devastated a 
peaceful population that did nothing to deserve its successive tragedies.
Between 1946 and 1958, the United States exploded sixty-seven nuclear 
weapons in the Marshall Islands, chiefly the atolls of Bikini and Enewetak—
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each a thin, broken circle of coral reefs surrounding a lagoon, the remnants of 
an ancient volcano. In the 1970s, as the United States was preparing to grant 
independence to the Marshall Islands, it considered what to do about the mess 
that the nuclear testing had left behind.
Bikini was so radioactive that there was little hope of allowing its dis-
placed population to return home in the foreseeable future. But the military 
studied how to reduce the radiation levels at Enewetak, the site of forty-four 
of the tests, so that at least some acreage could become habitable again. The 
bomb in one of these forty-four tests had misfired—only the high explosive was 
detonated, fragmenting the plutonium element and scattering it over a large 
area. Some of the debris from the explosion was immediately shoved into the 
lagoon to prepare the proving ground for another explosion twelve days later, 
but numerous plutonium-contaminated fragments were still scattered around 
the site.2
The United States considered several options for cleaning up Enewetak, 
ranging from simply covering the contaminated dirt with a blanket of clean 
soil to shipping it to disposal sites at home. The government chose to dump 
some of the waste into the crater left by one of the bombs, to shove some into 
the lagoon, and to leave some in place.
One of Enewetak’s forty islands is called Runit. Nine of the nuclear tests 
had been there, and another nine on barges in the nearby lagoon. During one 
of the tests, the “Cactus test” held on May 5, 1958, a weapon roughly the size 
as the Hiroshima bomb left a crater that was three hundred and fifty feet in 
diameter and thirty feet deep.3 That seemed about the right size for the hottest 
waste that the United States wanted to dispose of. Never mind that the crater 
was below sea level at high tide, 4 that the coral rock was naturally permeable,5 
and that there had been three other nuclear detonations within three hundred 
feet, so the rock was highly fractured.6 
The Department of Defense concluded that there was so much soil con-
taminated with radioactive cesium-137 and strontium-90 that moving it would 
result in severe ecological damage, so it would be allowed to decay naturally.7 
Both have a half-life of about thirty years (though it might not be safe to live 
nearby for quite a bit longer than that). Other waste—such as various kinds 
of low-level radioactive materials—might be more manageable. But the plu-
tonium-239 was of greatest concern. It has a half-life of twenty-four thousand 
years, and with enough of it in the right form, a bomb could be made. That is 
why, in an entirely different part of the world, the United States participated 
in a seventeen-year, $150 million operation, completed in 2013, to secure and 
clean up a Soviet-era nuclear test site in Kazakhstan that is contaminated with 
plutonium.8
At Enewetak, the Defense Department decided to put as much pluto-
nium as it could gather onto specially equipped landing craft and barges and 
dump it in the crater left by the Cactus test.9 Special attention was paid to the 
plutonium fragments that crews had picked off the ground and put in 437 
plastic bags.10 There was some discussion of extracting high-grade plutonium 
from them, but ultimately they went into the crater as well.11 Most of the rest 
of the radioactive waste, with no or too little plutonium to trouble with, was 
bulldozed into the lagoon.12 
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The then-newly-formed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) objected 
to disposal in the lagoon, but was overruled.13 The people of Enewetak and 
their attorney demanded total cleanup of the atoll and disposal of the mate-
rial elsewhere; the United States spurned this suggestion as well, and selected 
a plan that would leave radiation at levels far higher than what is allowed after 
similar domestic cleanups.14
The idea of lining the bottom of the crater with cement was rejected be-
cause it would have been expensive and time-consuming and not deemed to 
provide any greater protection. Instead, when the cleanup was conducted from 
1977 to 1979, the material was pumped as a concrete slurry to the bottom of the 
crater.15 Oversized material that could not be ground into cement was shoved 
into the crater.16 A later study by the National Research Council found that these 
methods “were not fully successful,” and left behind “unconsolidated… material 
that provide channels for water movement… at least part of the radioactivity 
contained in the structure is available for transport to the groundwater and, 
subsequently, to the lagoon.”17 
In total, over 104,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil were placed in the 
crater,18 plus an undetermined amount of sand that was blown or washed into 
the crater by one of the several typhoons that hit during the construction.19 It 
was then all covered over with a cement dome. The cement was supposed to be 
eighteen inches thick, but some of it was as thin as twelve and a half inches.20 
In all there are 357 concrete panels, placed without any internal reinforcing or 
expansion joints. The dome has a diameter of 367 feet and the containment 
area is 33 feet deep.21
The total cost of the cleanup of the atoll, such as it was, was $86.7 million. 
Over four thousand US servicemen were assigned to work on the cleanup at one 
time or another.22 Six lost their lives in accidents (though none related to the 
radiation).23 An uncertain number of Marshallese also worked on the cleanup, 
often given no information about radiation safety.24 Despite repeated requests 
from the Marshall Islands government, these workers have been denied access 
to the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, as only 
US citizens are eligible—a bill to change that rule to include Marshallese died 
in the United States Senate in 2010.25 
The cleanup was completed in 1979 and some of the residents of En-
ewetak—who had been forced out in 1946 to make way for the bombs—were 
allowed to return in 1980. It was not a return to their pre-nuclear homelands, 
however; about half the atoll was still uninhabitable and most of the remain-
ing land had become unsuitable for growing food.26 Canned spam became a 
staple food the Marshall Islands, contributing to a national obesity and diabetes 
crisis.27
Though the nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands ended in 1958, mili-
tary testing there continues. In the 1960s the Department of Defense carried 
out Project Shipboard Hazard and Defense (SHAD), which involved spraying 
biological aerosols to test protective masks and other defensive measures for 
biological warfare. A weapons system on a navy ship disseminated various bio-
logical material over parts of Enewetak. Whether it was harmless is a contested 
matter.28 Enewetak was also a primary location in the 1960s for the testing of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles and it was later used for test firing rocket 
90 SAIS Review    Winter–Spring 2015
motors.29 In 1971 and 1972, the air force conducted the Pacific Cratering Ex-
periments to predict the impact of nuclear detonations upon strategic defense 
installations. A series of detonations of conventional explosive charges took 
place in Enewetak until a court halted it in 1972.30 And to this day, pursuant to 
the Compact of Free Association discussed below, the Ronald Reagan Ballistic 
Missile Defense Test Site operates on the Marshall Islands’ atoll of Kwajalein. 
Intercontinental ballistic missiles are launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base 
in California to crash onto target sites on Kwajalein.31
A Visit
I was able to visit Runit in December 2010. I had been working with the Mar-
shall Islands’ government in studying the legal consequences of the threat that 
sea level rise poses to their national existence. There is no regular air service to 
Enewetak, but the week of my first visit to the country, there happened to be 
a special flight from the capital atoll of Majuro to take the US ambassador, the 
Marshall Islands’ first lady, and other dignitaries to the dedication of a school 
in Enewetak that the United States had financed.32 The Marshall Islands gov-
ernment arranged for me to have a seat on the plane and then for me to be put 
on a small boat to cross the lagoon. (In fact, our flight was delayed because of 
the planned launch of a missile toward Kwajalein, where we were stopping to 
refuel.)
When the boat reached Runit, we jumped out, crossed a narrow beach, 
walked through some shrub brush, and saw the dome. There were no signs, 
fences, or guards. (A photo of a warning sign appears on the Internet, but it 
was not there when I visited.) My guide walked up the shallow incline of the 
dome and stood on its top; impulsively, I followed him to the top. I only stayed 
a minute or two; I wished I had a Geiger Counter. Had I not already known 
what it was, the origins and nature of this concrete structure—about twice the 
area of a football field—would have been completely mysterious.
From this low perch a few feet above sea level, the most prominent fea-
tures are the twenty-three-mile-wide lagoon to the west,33 the Pacific Ocean to 
the east (2,724 miles to Honolulu), and just a few hundred feet to the north-
east, the almost-submerged crater from one of the other nuclear tests. In other 
words, as in most places in the Marshall Islands, what you see is mostly water.
Radioactive Waste on the Home Front
The United States government follows profoundly different procedures for dis-
posal of radioactive waste at home than in the Marshall Islands. The Marshall 
Islands have no representation in Congress and no other source of political 
clout. Though certain executive orders call for the military to observe many of 
the US environmental laws when operating abroad, they were not in effect at the 
time of the creation of the Runit dome; and the nongovernmental organizations 
that have been so influential in ensuring the enforcement of environmental 
laws in the United States have no presence in the Marshall Islands. At home, 
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US policy is to put nuclear waste in places where it cannot be released into the 
environment; in the Marshall Islands, the aim was far looser.
The government’s original plan for the 
spent fuel from nuclear power plants was to 
reprocess it into new fuel, much as the French 
have been doing since 1966.34 (In most of the 
reset of the world, spent fuel is held in tempo-
rary storage areas awaiting the development of 
permanent repositories.) However, a nuclear 
weapon test in India in 1974 (using plutonium 
from a research reactor) led President Gerald 
Ford and President Jimmy Carter to abandon 
this plan out of concern that the material 
would be susceptible to theft and that nuclear proliferation could result. (Con-
cerns about non-state terrorism were not yet as prominent as they became in 
later years, especially after September 11, 2001.) 
To find a safe way to dispose of this material, in 1982 Congress enacted 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which called for the permanent disposal of the 
spent fuel from nuclear power plants and other high-level nuclear waste in 
deep geologic repositories. An elaborate site selection study ensued, as did a 
great deal of politics, and in 1987, Congress selected Yucca Mountain, Nevada 
as the spot.35 The Department of Energy spent about $15 billion on studies36 
(including more than 450 boreholes to investigate the geology of the area37). 
The state of Nevada ferociously opposed this effort but lost all of the multiple 
lawsuits challenging it. However, in 2010, President Barack Obama cancelled 
the Yucca Mountain project, perhaps at the urging of the Democratic Senate 
Majority Leader, Harry Reid of Nevada, who was facing a tough reelection race. 
The president formed a blue ribbon commission to recommend a new plan for 
high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The resulting report called for continuing 
to store most of the HLW at the nuclear power plants where it was generated 
until a new site for a geologic repository was found and built; almost all such 
plants have spent fuel storage areas, many of which will need to be enlarged to 
hold the accumulating nuclear waste.38 These areas keep the HLW in pools of 
water for at least five years until it cools down sufficiently to be placed in dry 
casks.39 Extreme care is taken to ensure that none of the radioactivity enters 
the outside environment.
Another type of radioactive waste is transuranic waste (TNU)—material 
that is heavier than uranium, and chiefly composed of plutonium. In 1999 the 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico opened and began ac-
cepting TNU.40 The permanent disposal takes place 2,100 feet underground in 
rooms mined from an ancient salt bed, designed to ensure that no radiation 
can leak out. As of this writing in March 2015, it has not yet reopened due to 
concern over the incidents mentioned earlier. 
Much of the waste that is neither HLW nor TNU is classified as low-
level radioactive waste (LLRW). To find places for the permanent disposal of 
LLRW, Congress in 1980 enacted the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
and amended it in 1985. It required every state to come up with its own site for 
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LLRW, either on its own or in concert with other states pursuant to an interstate 
compact. In 1992, the US Supreme Court invalidated as a violation of the Tenth 
Amendment the part of the statute that required states that did not build their 
own facility or join in a compact that built one to assume ownership of the 
LLRW generated within their borders.41 Meanwhile, private companies acquired 
land and obtained permits to build LLRW disposal facilities in Utah and, later, 
Texas. This eased the pressure on finding a governmentally-sited facility and, 
to date, no facilities sited pursuant to the federal statute have come even close 
to being approved. The private facilities are under close supervision designed 
to ensure no radioactive releases.
The domestic site for testing nuclear weapons was called the Nevada 
Proving Grounds, then the Nevada Test Site, and now (since 2010) the Nevada 
National Security Site. It is 1,360 square miles (larger than the state of Rhode 
Island) and was the scene of approximately one hundred detonations. The De-
partment of Energy is in the midst of a complex, multi-decade process of clean-
ing up the site. Processing uranium ore to make nuclear fuel, nuclear weapons, 
and all other products leaves behind large quantities of waste material called 
“tailings.” Tailings were long placed in immense outdoor piles from where wind 
and rain could spread the material, including low quantities of radiation, to 
surrounding areas. The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 
is designed to remediate contaminated sites. This is carried out primarily by 
moving the waste into containment areas, covering it with compacted clay or 
other material, and topping it all with rocks or vegetation.
In sum, US policy displays a broad range of tolerance for the release of 
radiation into the environment. For HLW, TNU, and LLRW, zero releases are 
tolerable. For uranium mill tailings, there is a policy to halt the immediate 
releases and engage in long-term remediation. None of these laws comes any-
where close to condoning the bulldozing of large quantities of radioactively 
contaminated debris into a lagoon that is open to the ocean, as occurred in the 
Marshall Islands; they all call for secure storage or disposal in highly engineered 
structures.
The Future of Runit
Since the seas are rising, a natural question is what will become of the Runit 
dome. Longevity was not among the design criteria (unlike today’s plans for 
facilities like Yucca Mountain) and the Defense Nuclear Agency found in 1981 
some construction deficiencies “which could affect the durability of the crater 
portion of the structure.”42 A task force of the National Research Council wrote 
in 1982 (long before sea level rise became a prominent issue), that “Probably 
the greatest hazard to the dome structure as well as to the people living on 
Enewetak Atoll will come from typhoons, which sometimes completely inun-
date these low islands. Although the dome was designed to withstand severe 
storm wave and typhoon activity, the typhoons in this part of the world are so 
severe that a series of these conceivably could cause breachment of the dome 
structure.”43
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However, not to worry. A 2013 report from the Department of Energy 
stated, “Catastrophic failure of the concrete dome facade covering the debris 
mount and instantaneous release of all its contents into the lagoon will not 
necessarily lead to any significant change in the radiation dose delivered to the 
local population.”44
The reason for this counterintuitive conclusion is shocking. The 2013 
report found that the radiation inside the dome is “dwarfed” by the radiation 
in the sediments in the lagoon outside,45 thanks to the residue from the forty-
four nuclear tests over Enewetak. Thus the US agencies say that a leak from 
the dome would not cause environmental damage because it is dirtier on the 
outside than the inside.46 
There is so much radiation in the sediments that it is spreading great 
distances. In February 2014, scientists looking for far-flung residue from the 
Fukushima nuclear accident found plutonium isotopes in the South China 
Sea that they traced through their atomic footprints to the Pacific Proving 
Grounds in the Marshall Islands. Some was old fallout, but they also found 
continuous transport of plutonium from the Marshall Islands along a feature 
of Pacific Ocean circulation called the North 
Equatorial Current, from a distance of about 
2,800 miles.47 A lot of this fallout may be from 
the Enewetak and Bikini lagoons, but probably 
not Runit dome.
Nonetheless, Runit dome would not 
meet today’s US standards for the disposal of 
household trash. The dome lacks any liner at 
the bottom, a secure cap on top, or a system to collect water, and is placed above 
fractured rock and next to the water and below sea level—a municipal landfill 
could not be built in such a way.48 
At least some of the dome will probably be above water most of the time 
well into the next century. However, the ocean waters will wash over it with 
increasing frequency and in a few decades—just when is not clear—at high tide 
the lower part of it will probably be submerged.
In 2011, Congress required the Department of Energy to undertake new 
inspections of Runit, and it did so in May and June 2013.49 The results show 
the concrete dome is deteriorating and the radioactive groundwater below rises 
and falls with the tides.50 Storms wash sand onto the dome and vines grow into 
the cracks.51 One day, the Runit dome will likely be submerged or torn apart 
by storms.52 
Legal Remedies
After World War II, the Marshall Islands became a United Nations (UN) trust 
territory under the administration of the United States. In 1986, the United 
States and the Marshall Islands entered into the Compact of Free Association, 
under which the Marshall Islands would become an independent sovereign 
nation; the new Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) was admitted to the 
. . . Runit dome would not 
meet today’s US standards 
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United Nations in 1991. The Compact provided for payment of $150 million to 
RMI in compensation for the damages to the country and its citizens as a result 
of the nuclear weapons testing program and for the establishment of a Nuclear 
Claims Tribunal to determine the recipients and amounts of the payments. 
The Tribunal held hearings for two years and decided that over $2 billion 
in total damages that should be awarded.53 RMI presented a petition to Con-
gress to increase the payments to meet the amount awarded by the Tribunal.54 
Congress took no action. Lawsuits were instituted against the United States to 
compel payment, but the federal courts declared that they had no jurisdiction 
over the matter.55 The United States Supreme Court refused to take the case, 
and RMI was left to continue to ask Congress to provide relief. This has been 
completely fruitless.
The US environmental statute that comes closest to providing relief is the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. It allows persons at risk of “immi-
nent and substantial endangerment” from hazardous waste to sue to compel a 
cleanup. However, the statute and EPA regulations contain detailed definitions 
of “hazardous waste” as covered by the statute, and it is not apparent that any 
of the material in Runit dome or the nearby lagoon falls within that definition.
At the international level, RMI is faring no better. At the Conference of 
the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in 2009, the parties overwhelmingly ac-
cepted an objective of preventing global average temperatures from exceeding 
2°C above pre-industrial conditions. RMI and the other low-lying island na-
tions vigorously protested, since the scientific evidence suggests that at 2°C, they 
would be entirely submerged in the next century and uninhabitable well before 
then; they demanded an objective of 1.5°C. The 2°C goal has been repeatedly 
reaffirmed in the subsequent UN conferences, with a weak pledge to reevaluate 
in some subsequent year. A continuation of business-as-usual emissions growth 
would bring us to around 4°C by the end of the century. If the United States, 
China, and the European Union all carry out their current non-binding pledges, 
and if several other nations join in, we will probably be in the neighborhood 
of 3°C by the end of the century.56
The United Nations Human Rights Council has appointed a Special Rap-
porteur on Toxic Wastes. In 2012, the Special Rapporteur issued a report on 
his investigation of the legacy of nuclear testing in RMI. The report referenced 
Runit dome but made no recommendations as to it.57 Even if it had, the Human 
Rights Council has no power to compel the United States or other countries 
to take action.
In 2011 the Republic of Palau and RMI joined in an effort to seek an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague 
with respect to the obligations of the major developed nations to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions so that the small island nations do not drown. Under 
the United Nations Charter, this question could have been submitted to the 
ICJ upon a favorable vote of a majority of the members of the Untied Nations 
General Assembly. The United States actively opposed this effort and nowhere 
near the requisite number of votes could be obtained.
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One aspect of the Compact of Free Association that has been effective is 
the permission it granted the people of the Marshall Islands to immigrate to the 
United States. A steady stream of Marshallese are moving to the United States 
for the jobs, education and health care available here; of the nation’s popula-
tion of about sixty thousand, nearly ten thousand (both of these numbers are 
highly uncertain) live in northwestern Arkansas, centered around the factories 
of Tysons Foods, their largest employer. Almost the entirety of RMI has an 
elevation of about two meters above sea level on a calm day (and no place 
is more than three or four meters, thanks to the biology of coral reef forma-
tion). If the Runit dome stays intact, by the time it is underwater, so will be 
the rest of the Marshall Islands; its entire population will have had to flee for 
dry land. Thus there will be no nearby human neighbors of the dome, but its 
plutonium residue will be carried far by the ocean currents. There is probably 
no telling whether, when and where there will be sufficient concentrations to 
harm aquatic life and the people who depend on it.
Conclusion
The United States detonated sixty-seven nuclear weapons at the Marshall Is-
lands. (More precisely it detonated sixty-six—one attempt failed, leading to a 
conventional explosive shatter-
ing the plutonium warhead and 
spraying fragments that were 
later collected in plastic bags.) 
Congress then failed to pay the 
compensation that the Con-
gressionally-chartered Nuclear 
Claims Tribunal found should 
be paid. Today the cumulative 
greenhouse gas emissions of the 
United States (the largest single 
contributor) and the other na-
tions of the world are raising the seas and one day will almost certainly sub-
merge all of the Marshall Islands.
Runit dome stands—and eventually will sink—as a testament to the 
failure of US and international law to protect this vulnerable island nation 
from the devastation caused, first by the Cold War and now by the industrially-
induced warming of the planet.
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